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Anxious periods and bank lending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a number of theoretical considerations, we define distinct periods of anxiety for key 
economic agents that are involved in lending decisions; namely, consumers, CEOs, and 
banks. The main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations 
about economic conditions worsen for these agents even though the economy is not in a 
recession. Subsequently, we study the lending behavior of US banks during the three distinct 
pools of anxious quarters from 1985-2010, using bank-level data. We find that banks’ lending 
falls when consumers and banks are anxious, and this effect is more pronounced when banks 
hold a high level of credit risk. Yet, in those anxious periods that were followed by 
recessions, the negative impact of anxiety on loan growth is significantly weaker for banks 
with high-credit risk that points to the existence of a moral-hazard mechanism. We also find 
significant differentiation in banks’ lending within anxious periods across different loan 
categories. We contend that these findings point to the identification of an ‘expectations 
channel’ in banks’ lending that exists throughout the business cycle. 
 
JEL classification: G21; E44; E32; D22 
Keywords: Banks’ lending; Anxious periods; Consumers; CEOs; Banks; Bank characteristics 
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1. Introduction  
A large amount of literature stresses the essential role that banks play as liquidity providers 
and transmitters of monetary policy shocks (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Hölstrom and Tirole, 1997). Moreover, the literature pays special 
attention to this role during or at the onset of recessions (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1996). A new 
line of research highlights the strong impact of expectations over the business cycle for 
leverage and, thus, credit (Bhattacharya et al., 2011; Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008; 
Geanakoplos, 2010). This literature stresses that changes in expectations can cause credit 
cycles; namely, fluctuations in leverage and credit can affect the path of the economy. These 
fluctuations range from expansions, in which banks’ lending increases and risk aversion 
decreases, to contractions or even crises, in which lending deteriorates and risk preferences 
shift to safer assets. The financial turmoil that started in 2007 and led to a panic in the fall of 
2008 shows the importance of banks’ lending behavior in the formation of the development 
and reinforcement of the crisis. 
In this paper, we explore changes in banks’ loan supply during periods when 
economic prospects worsen, but the economy is not in a recession. This subject is of great 
interest because banks’ lending behavior during these periods can either ease uncertainty or 
impose further strain on the economy. Specifically, this behavior can cause credit crunches 
with serious implications for the economy and the banking system. How can these phases of 
economic anxiety be identified from the data and how is banks’ lending shaped during such 
phases? Do bank lending decisions have any role during these anxiety periods for the 
origination of banking problems or even the start of a crisis? Our paper aims to shed some 
light on these questions and points to a distinct channel driven by expectations that affects 
banks’ lending decisions. 
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We borrow the discussion of an anxious economy from Fostel and Geanakoplos 
(2008) who define anxious periods as intermediate states of the economy related to bad 
news in the market. These anxious states of the economy might be followed by a recession 
or, as in most cases, the economy moves back to a good state. Here, we place this concept of 
anxiety within a real-economy framework and bring financial intermediaries explicitly into 
the picture (see Shin, 2009). In our setting, there are three main players in the economy: 
households, firms and banks themselves. These agents’ expectations on future economic 
outcomes can exert significant influence on the contemporaneous lending behavior of banks. 
Even though the anxieties of these agents might be interrelated and contemporaneous, the 
three agents can still be anxious during different times on the basis of their imperfect 
information about shocks in the economy (see, among others, Kydland and Prescott, 1982; 
Collard et al., 2009), rational inattention (Carroll, 2003; Sims, 2003, 2010), or even their 
own asymmetric goals and strategies. Thus, our setting provides the opportunity to 
investigate the response of banks’ loan supply to the heterogeneous perceptions and 
expectations about the economy of different agents about the economy, rather than 
employing measures that encompass aggregate expectations about future economic 
conditions. 
Therefore, we rely on a distinct measure of anxiety for each of the three economic 
agents and identify anxious periods from each agent’s perspective. In particular, we use 
three indices that explicitly characterize consumers’ and CEOs’ (firms’) falling confidence 
and banks’ tightening terms of credit; all of which, by definition, encompass diminishing 
expectations on economic prospects. First, consumers’ confidence has information content 
about future economic activity rather than causes economic outcomes (Barsky and Sims, 
2011); second, CEOs’ confidence responds earlier and more to policy shocks than 
consumers’ confidence (Bachman and Sims, 2010); third, the tightening of credit reflects 
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rather than causes worsening economic conditions (Lown and Morgan, 2006). We term the 
falling confidence of consumers and CEOs and the banks’ tightening terms of credit as 
consumers’, CEOs’, and banks’ anxiety, respectively. 
We employ quarterly data on banks from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) Y9-C call reports over the 1985Q1–2010Q2 period and perform our analysis only 
for the anxious periods identified from each agent’s perspective. Using this panel, we look 
into the effect of consumers’, CEOs’, and banks’ anxieties on loan growth through certain 
bank characteristics. This framework has a number of important advantages. First, it eases 
concerns about the simultaneity problem; that is, distinguishing shifts in loan supply from 
those of loan demand, because we use interaction terms between certain bank characteristics 
and the variables of interest (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Moreover, the fact that these 
variables contain information about future economic activity, further eases such concerns. A 
battery of robustness checks provides further support against simultaneity. 
Second, the fact that recessions do not follow all economic slowdowns and declines 
in agents’ expectations suggests a special role for banks’ lending. In this way, we aim to 
shed some light not only to the term horizon of banks when things in the economy get worse 
(see Rajan, 1994), but also to the possible similarities in banks’ lending activity during 
anxious periods and recessions. Third, our framework provides a strategy for examining 
which bank characteristics determine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods 
and whether the more important banks follow different strategies due to moral-hazard issues 
associated with too-big-to-fail concerns of governments, regulators, and the public. Last but 
not least, our framework offers some insights on the way in which banks conduct 
competition when different economic agents are anxious about future economic outcomes. 
Our results indicate that consumers’ and banks’ anxieties negatively affect loan 
supply, and this response is primarily distributed through high-credit risk. Other bank 
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characteristics, such as capitalization and liquidity, do not seem to drive banks’ lending 
decisions in anxious periods. In contrast, total loan growth is less sensitive to CEOs’ 
confidence even though the growth of certain loan categories passes through the 
provisioning decisions of banks. Notably, these findings are different, if not opposite, in 
anxious periods that actually lead to a recession. This difference potentially suggests a 
special role for banks in exacerbating the economic downturn. In addition, evidence exists 
that large banks tend to react more than smaller ones to the signs of anxiety; however, their 
reaction frequently involves a higher loan growth relative to the average bank during 
anxious periods. Several robustness checks provide strong support to these results. In 
general, these findings suggest the potential existence of a new channel for the lending 
behavior of banks that can be termed an ‘expectations channel.’ Our study is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first to provide empirical evidence on the existence of such a channel 
that affects the supply of credit from banks and the way it operates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the concept of 
anxious periods of the economy. This section also surveys the literature on consumers’ and 
CEOs’ expectations and their relation to the economy, as well as discussing banks’ lending 
strategies across the business cycle. Section 3 describes the data and the identification 
strategy of the anxious phases of the economy, while Section 4 discusses the empirical 
method. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Anxious periods 
As already mentioned, we borrow the discussion on the three states of the economy—good, 
anxious, and bad—from Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) and place it within a real-economy 
setting with incomplete information. In our context, bad times are the recession periods that 
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we identify by following the NBER’s formal definition. We use banks’ lending activity 
during recessions as a benchmark against their activity during anxious periods. The sample 
period examined, 1985Q1–2010Q2, encompasses three recession periods: 1990Q3–1991Q1, 
2001Q2–2001Q4, and 2008Q1–2009Q2. 
However, during anxious phases different economic agents can view different 
economic outcomes or perceive policy shocks and/or news about the economy in a rather 
different way. For example, a restructuring of the tax system towards higher personal 
income and lower corporate taxation might improve firms’ appraisal of future economic 
conditions and worsen consumers’ perception about their own future income. In addition, 
consumers might be more concerned with fluctuations in employment or prices. Moreover, 
the presence of informational asymmetries between CEOs and consumers can add to this 
heterogeneity in perceptions and expectations. It is natural to assume that firms’ managers 
are generally better informed about the prospects of the economy than consumers, because 
they focus on investment prospects and future profitability, which a large number of factors 
affect. To this end, businessmen and CEOs have better access to information and possibly a 
better understanding of economic news and analyses. Bachman and Sims (2010) verify the 
advantage of CEOs over consumers in reacting more quickly to economic signals and point 
out that CEOs’ confidence responds earlier and by more to a policy shock than consumers’ 
confidence does. 
Moreover, banks can also have their own view about current and future economic 
conditions that determines their lending strategy, which may not, at least in principle, 
coincide with those of CEOs and consumers. Stated more explicitly, it might be the case that 
CEOs, consumers, and banks do not share the same expectations nor do they have the same 
information set at a certain point in time about the economy and its prospects. 
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Given the above, we employ three separate indices to capture consumers’, CEOs’, 
and banks’ anxieties regarding the state of the economy. From the consumers’ and CEOs’ 
points of view, we represent their anxieties as falling consumers’ and CEOs’ confidences. 
From the banks’ point of view, we represent anxiety with rising lending standards. 
We briefly review the literature on the role of consumer and CEO confidence in 
Section 2.1 below. A discussion about the relationship between bank lending during anxious 
periods is given in Section 2.2. Finally, details on the three indices used to specify anxious 
periods for each agent’s perspective and on the rules employed for the identification of 
anxious periods are provided in Section 3. 
 
2.1. Confidence and the economy 
The role of confidence in the economy ranges from causing economic outcomes, the ‘animal 
spirits view’ (Keynes, 1936; Blanchard, 1993; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), to being an 
information provider for the future state of the economy, the ‘information view’ (Cochrane, 
1994; Bachman and Sims, 2010). In line with this second view, confidence can also be a 
time-varying discount factor for the future state of the economy (Bachman and Sims, 2010). 
However, very recently Barsky and Sims (2011) provide strong evidence in favor of the 
information content of consumers’ confidence about future economic activity rather than the 
‘animal spirits view.’ This evidence provides strong support to our choice for representing 
consumers’ anxiety about future economic prospects with falling confidence and eases 
concerns on the potential simultaneity problem of distinguishing between the effects of 
consumers’ confidence on loan supply versus that on loan demand. 
Briefly, empirical evidence suggests that consumers’ confidence has predictive 
ability over relatively short horizons for economic aggregates (Matsusaka and Sbordonne, 
1995; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) and future consumption growth (Carroll et al., 
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1994; Ludvigson, 2004). It also plays a prominent role in the Fed’s intervention decisions 
(Hu and Phillips, 2004) and has emerged as a much better barometer of economic activity 
and investors’ attitudes during the last three decades (Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006). 
The vast majority of the literature focuses on consumers’ confidence. A rare 
exception is Bachman and Sims (2010) who find that both consumers’ and CEOs’ 
confidences play a modest role in the transmission of policy shocks into the economy, 
although CEOs’ confidence plays a more essential role to this propagation than consumers’ 
confidence in that it responds earlier and more to these shocks. 
 
2.2. Banks’ lending decisions in anxious times 
Apart from the well-documented credit channel that drives banks’ lending decisions over the 
business cycle (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), the literature also puts forth other 
mechanisms. Specifically, Lown and Morgan (2006) document that lending standards are 
superior to interest rates in explaining economic fluctuations, but shocks to the monetary-
policy rate do not cause changes in standards. They also show that part of lending standards’ 
variation is related to changes in loan supply rather than demand; while a tightening in 
banks’ lending standards, anxiety in our framework, might just reflect, rather than cause 
through loan supply, a worsening in economic conditions. 
The empirically documented countercyclical variation in banks’ lending standards 
(see e.g., Asea and Bloomberg, 1998) can be attributed to bank managers’ short-term 
interest and reputation considerations (Rajan, 1994) as well as to their growing inability to 
identify potential borrowers’ problems as the business cycle evolves (Berger and Udell, 
2004). Ruckes (2004) shows that bank efforts in the screening of potential borrowers 
exhibits an inverse U-shape as a function of economic prospects. As he argues, this is 
primarily due to the varying quality of borrowers and the relevant profitability of 
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information production; however, screening effort also depends on the loan applicants’ 
sector. 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) examine banks’ strategic behavior in credit 
screening and lending decisions and show that information asymmetry across banks moves 
in the same direction as lending standards, while its effect on banks’ lending behavior 
operates either through credit screening or collateral requirements. More recently, Gorton 
and He (2008) attribute periodic credit crunches and endogenous credit cycles to banks’ 
strategic competition for borrowers through lending standards rather than loan prices. 
As the majority of this literature stresses (e.g., Rajan, 1994; Ruckes, 2004), banking 
problems and financial instability originate in boom times. However, as the economy moves 
to anxious periods, uncertainty increases and the quality of borrowers deteriorates. The same 
is true for asymmetric information across banks, because the value of public information 
reduces and banks’ screening effort increases (Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 
2006). The effects of these changes on banks’ lending can be exacerbated by the strategic 
competition for borrowers between banks (Gorton and He, 2008). All the above point to a 
reduction in lending during anxious periods that might be caused by (i) tighter terms of 
credits, (ii) changing lending decisions by banks towards different loan categories, and (iii) 
increased collateral requirements for new loans. 
Yet, bank loan portfolios are not easily restructured and bank characteristics that 
reflect past bank behavior in asset management can also play a key role. For example, lax 
lending behavior by banks during good times in the economy can put a considerable burden 
on banks’ credit risk during anxious times and thus affect their contemporary lending 
decisions. A low liquidity position or capitalization of banks can also put additional weight 
on institutions. If banks deleverage their balance sheets during anxious periods, and do so 
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simultaneously, this strategy might cause systemic stress through a liquidity crunch and 
threaten financial stability (Adrian and Shin, 2008). 
 
3. Data description and identification of anxious periods 
3.1. Data and variables 
Table 1 reports how the variables employed in the empirical analysis are measured and their 
data sources. Data on the bank-level variables come from the Y-9C call reports. The Y-9C 
call reports provide financial account data on a quarterly basis for all commercial banks that 
are regulated by the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and the Comptroller of the Currency. We use data on all available commercial banks for the 
period 1985Q1–2010Q2. This data yield an initial unbalanced panel of 1,116,397 bank-
quarter observations. 
From this dataset, we calculate for each bank the total loan growth as the change in 
the natural logarithm of total loans over the previous quarter. This is the main dependent 
variable of our study. To get more insights into the lending behavior of banks during periods 
of anxiety, we also examine three separate loan categories. These categories are: loans to 
consumers, commercial and industrial loans, and loans secured by real estate. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
As already mentioned, the main explanatory variables of our study relate to 
consumers’, CEOs’, and banks’ anxieties. We measure the anxieties of these agents with the 
falling confidences of consumers and CEOs and for the tightening terms of credit by banks. 
For consumers’ confidence we use the Conference Board’s consumers’ confidence survey 
that is conducted monthly on a representative sample of 5,000 consumers. In this survey, 
there are five questions that measure the following: current (i) business and (ii) employment 
conditions; six-month expectations on (iii) business and (iv) employment conditions, as well 
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as (v) total family income. There are three available responses to each of these questions: 
positive, negative, and neutral. After a seasonal adjustment for the response rate, a single 
sub-index value is calculated for each question as the ratio of positive answers to the sum of 
neutral and negative ones, relatively to the relevant ratio for the calendar year 1985. The 
consumers’ confidence index is then calculated as the average of all five sub-indices. Lower 
values in this index reflect higher consumers’ anxiety. 
In turn, for CEOs’ confidence we use the Conference Board’s CEO survey. This 
survey is conducted quarterly using a sample of 100 CEOs from ten industrial sectors that 
span the economic activity of the country. The sectors include manufacturing of durable and 
non-durables goods, as sell as services. The survey has four questions that measure the 
following: current (i) economic conditions, (ii) conditions in the specific industry each CEO 
belongs to compared to that six months ago, and expectations about (iii) the economy, and 
(iv) the specific industry in a six-month horizon. The available answers are classified as 
substantially better, moderately better, same, not substantially better and substantially worse; 
each taking the numerical value of 100, 75, 50, 25, and 0 respectively. Then, the value of the 
CEO-confidence index is calculated as the average of the values of the answers that results 
in a number in the [0, 100] interval. Lower values of this index reflect higher CEOs’ anxiety. 
Lastly, to represent banks’ anxiety, we use banks’ terms of credit for commercial and 
industrial loans to large and medium firms. These data (available from 1990Q2 onwards) 
come from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on banks’ lending practices. The 
Federal Reserve conducts this survey quarterly on a panel of 60 large domestic banks and up 
to 24 branches of foreign banks. Its main purpose is to provide qualitative information on 
the credit market and lending conditions in the U.S. The survey covers banks from all of the 
Federal Reserve Districts and is heavily weighted towards large banks in order to capture 
the development and implementation of new banking techniques. The index of banks’ terms 
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of credit is the ratio of respondents reporting the tightening  of terms during the previous 
quarter minus those who report easing terms to the sum of respondents. In contrast to the 
consumer- and CEO-confidence indices, a higher value on banks’ terms of credit reflects 
rising banks’ anxiety on future economic conditions. 
The lending equation is identified at the bank level, and thus we need to control for a 
number of individual bank characteristics. In addition, the role of these variables is 
important to the empirical identification of the loan-supply equation. Following the relevant 
literature (e.g., Altunbas et al. 2010), we employ variables such as bank capitalization, size, 
non-performing loans, provisions, liquidity, and the banks’ lending rate.1 Formal definitions 
for these variables are provided in Table 1. 
In forming the banks’ lending equations, we also control for the general 
macroeconomic conditions that affect all banks in the sample, using the change in the 
natural logarithm of the industrial production volume. In our robustness checks, we also use 
the Federal Funds rate. Finally, we control for the regulatory changes that took place in the 
U.S. banking industry during the period examined by constructing two dummy variables 
(DUMj). The first takes a value one from 1989Q3 onwards to capture the effect of the 
“Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act” enacted on August 9, 1989. The second 
takes a value one from 1994Q4 onwards to capture the effect of the “Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act” enacted on September 29, 1994. Although a number 
of other regulatory changes took place during the period examined (Sherman, 2009), our 
preliminary results point to the inclusion of just these two dummies. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables employed. We report the 
number of observations available for each variable along with the mean, standard deviation, 
and the minimum and maximum values. Also, Table 3 shows that correlation coefficients 
                                                 
1 We also experiment with other variables such as the cost to income ratio, the loans to deposits ratio, the loans 
to assets ratio, etc. These variables do not add to the empirical framework. 
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between the main variables of our study are not high enough to suggest multicollinearity 
issues. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
Interestingly, the correlation coefficient between consumers’ and CEOs’ confidence 
takes a value of -0.11 that suggests CEOs and consumers do not react contemporaneously 
and/or in the same direction to the arrival of news. This is in line with the discussion in 
Section 2 about the heterogeneity of perceptions and expectations about the economy 
between CEOs and consumers. Moreover, this pattern is consistent with the finding of 
Bachman and Sims (2010) on the earlier response of CEOs’ confidence to shocks related to 
consumers’ confidence. The correlation coefficient between banks’ terms of credit and 
CEOs’ confidence is -0.60, but the correlation coefficient between banks’ terms of credit and 
consumers’ confidence is -0.17.2 This difference suggests that banks and CEOs share more 
common beliefs and expectations about the economy and its prospects than banks and 
consumers. 
Figure 1 shows the time evolution of the consumers’ and CEOs’ confidences and 
bank terms of credit over our sample period together with the industrial production growth 
(y-o-y) and total loan growth (y-o-y). Consumers’ confidence clearly exhibits a pro-cyclical 
behavior. In contrast, CEOs’ confidence increases substantially in periods shortly after a 
recession ends or even when expectations suggest that the recession is ending. Moreover, 
periods in which consumers’ confidence falls and consumers’ anxiety rises do not generally 
coincide with periods when CEOs’ confidence falls. Another point worth mentioning is that 
consumers’ confidence has larger swings than CEOs’ confidence, but the latter exhibits a 
greater number of small fluctuations around its short-run trend. As for banks’ terms of 
credit, it is well documented in the literature (Berger and Udell, 1998; Lown et al. 2000; 
                                                 
2 The negative correlation coefficients stem from the opposite definitions of the relevant indices with respect to 
anxiety. 
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Lown and Morgan, 2006) that this measure has countercyclical variation, which is also 
apparent in Figure 1. Interestingly, banks’ terms of credit start rising right before recession 
periods and exhibit a peak during them. The only exception is in the 2001 recession, where 
it peaked about one quarter before the event. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3.2. Identification of anxious periods 
Apart from the measure of the size of anxiety from each economic agent’s perspective, we 
need to identify the periods for which this anxiety holds and for which we perform our 
empirical analysis. For this, we use a heuristic approach and obtain three distinct pools of 
quarters characterized by anxieties for consumers, CEOs, or banks respectively. In 
particular, we define anxious periods from each agent’s perspective as a consecutive two-
quarter decline in the value of the variable when the economy is not in a recession. For 
banks, this rule applies from 1990Q2 onwards when data on banks’ terms of credit is 
available. This approach yields 18 quarters of anxieties for consumers and CEOs out of 
which only 4 quarters are common between the two. These are 1993Q3, 2005Q3, 2007Q3, 
and 2007Q4. For banks, we identify 14 quarters of anxiety. Only in 5 are consumers also 
anxious, while both CEOs and banks are anxious in the same 3 quarters. Interestingly, in 
only one quarter during the period examined, 2007Q4, are all agents simultaneously 
anxious. These figures justify our approach of examining anxieties from the three different 
economic agents’ perspective and confirm the heterogeneity in agents’ perceptions and 
expectations about the worsening of economic conditions. 
To examine the sensitivity of our results, we also employ a second rule. Specifically, 
we define as anxious periods those in which each agent’s confidence (i) has been falling for 
one quarter, (ii) is lower than their sample mean, and (iii) the economy is not in a recession. 
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This second rule yields 19 quarters of anxiety for consumers, 13 for CEOs, and 9 for banks. 
From these, in only two quarters are consumers and CEOs both anxious, 1996Q1 and 
2007Q4, while 2007Q4 is again the only quarter in which all three agents are 
simultaneously anxious. 
Figures 2 through 4 illustrate the anxious periods for consumers, CEOs, and banks 
under the first rule along with the GDP growth rate (y-o-y) respectively. Anxious periods are 
in blue, and recession periods are in grey. Evidently, periods of consumers’ anxiety always 
precede recession periods (see Figure 2). In contrast, Figure 3 shows that CEOs were 
anxious only before the 2008 recession. Finally, banks were anxious before both the 2001 
and 2008 recessions. 
[Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 here] 
 
4. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical strategy builds on the literature relying on banks’ lending equations. Kashyap 
and Stein (2000), and many others since, show how to overcome a number of identification 
problems when examining the existence of a banks’ lending channel of monetary policy. 
Their strategy involves disentangling the effect of macroeconomic variables on loan supply 
from the respective effect of these variables on loan demand (simultaneity problem). To this 
end, this literature proposes using bank-level data and interaction effects between certain 
individual bank characteristics and the macroeconomic determinants of lending. This 
strategy provides a reduced-form equation with the capability of identifying shifts in loan 
supply. 
In addition, Kashyap and Stein (2000) suggest a solution to the so-called endogeneity 
problem. In particular, the use of relatively high-frequency data, such as quarterly data, 
allows for examining the lending behavior of banks when these banks view the state of the 
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economy and elements of their own portfolio as predetermined. In other words, banks make 
lending decisions on the basis, inter alia, of the behavior of other economic agents, the state 
of the economy, and the strength of their balance sheet in the previous quarter. Therefore, 
this strategy substantially eases concerns on reverse causality issues.  
The actual empirical model to be estimated for the three distinct pools of anxious 
quarters is the following: 
itj
j
jittkit
k
ki
tkit
k
kiitit
uDUMaINDaABa
AaBaloansaaloans
++∆+∆∗+
∆++∆+=∆
∑∑
∑
−−−
−−−
15144
1342110
ln
)ln()ln(
, (1) 
where the loan growth of bank i over the previous quarter is regressed on its lag, a number k 
of bank characteristics B observed over the previous year, the change in the relevant anxiety 
variable A for the respective agent between time t-1 and t-2, the interaction of these anxiety 
indices with bank characteristics,3 the change in industrial production volume IND between 
time t-1 and t-2, and the two regulatory dummies DUMj defined in subsection 3.1. 
In equation (1), the parameter a3 captures both demand and supply-side effects. 
Hence, the choice of the bank characteristics to be interacted with A is crucial to the solution 
of the simultaneity problem. In general, identification is guaranteed as long as the impact of 
each agent’s anxiety is not uniform across banks with differential characteristics. Kashyap 
and Stein (2000) suggest using bank size and liquidity. The concept is that larger and more 
liquid banks can better protect their loan portfolio by lowering their larger stock of 
securities. Kishan and Opiela (2000) suggest that more capitalized banks are also able to 
insulate their loans from the effects of an adverse development by using the excess buffer of 
capital stock. Finally, Altunbas et al. (2010) suggest that financial innovation and the wider 
                                                 
3 Given that the correlation between the level and the interaction terms is very high (i.e., an indication of 
multicollinearity), we mean-center the variables (i.e., generate new variables by subtracting their means). 
Mean-centering also allows interpreting the coefficient of anxiety variables financial on loan growth at the 
average level of bank characteristics rather than at the point where each bank characteristic is zero. 
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use of new ways of transferring credit risk have tended to diminish the informational content 
of the above standard bank-balance-sheet indicators. They show that indicators of credit risk 
should be used along with size, capitalization, and liquidity to identify the transmission of 
macro variables on banks’ lending. We also follow this strategy to identify the impact of 
anxiety on loan growth and use two measures of credit risk based on loan-loss provisions 
and problem loans along with the usual capitalization, liquidity, and size variables. 
In the present analysis, we deviate from the literature on the banks’ lending channel 
of monetary policy in a number of ways. First and foremost, the anxiety variables enter the 
estimated model in alternative equations, and these equations are estimated using only 
(unless otherwise specified) the relevant pool of quarters during which the relevant agent is 
anxious. This choice provides a direct answer on how banks’ loan behavior is shaped during 
the phases of anxiety of the three agents. 
Second, on more technical grounds, we do not include many time lags on the 
dependent and the explanatory variables common to all banks (the literature using quarterly 
data tends to include four time lags). The main reason for this choice is that multicollinearity 
of the lags tends to affect inference substantially. Instead, we assume that banks observe the 
developments captured by the macro variables in the previous quarter; and, in conjunction 
with the strength of their balance sheets relative to the same quarter of the previous year, 
they decide whether and by how much they will expand lending. 
Third, and related to the second, we include only the fourth lag of the variables that 
indicate the strength of banks’ balance sheets. The reason is that data on bank 
characteristics, such as liquidity and capitalization, are highly seasonal because of the 
accounting practices used by banks. A correction for this type of seasonality in terms of 
sophisticated econometric methods finds no consensus in the literature. Thus, it seems safer 
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to assume that banks decide to expand their lending based on the information they have on 
the position of their balance-sheet strength over the same quarter of the previous year.4 
Fourth, we do not focus on the identification of a banks’ lending channel of monetary 
policy; and, thus, we do not include a policy interest rate among the regressors in the 
baseline specifications. This choice provides additional flexibility to our model because 
there is no consensus on what the proper monetary policy instrument should be. In contrast, 
we include a proxy for the bank-level lending rate among the explanatory variables that 
makes equation (1) a de facto bank loan-supply equation. This choice further eases concerns 
on other identification problems stemming from misspecification of the lending rate, 
because this variable is observed at the bank level. However, we do provide some sensitivity 
analysis of the results by including the Federal Funds rate among the regressors (instead of 
the bank-level lending rate). Overall, we feel that these assumptions represent an accurate 
approximation of banks’ behavior. 
Regarding the estimation method employed, the literature proposes using either an 
endogenous panel data estimation method or GMM for dynamic panels. The latter method 
seems to be the most favored in recent studies (see, e.g., Gambacorta, 2008; Altunbas et al., 
2010). Yet, in panels with a relatively large time dimension as in our case, the number of 
instruments under GMM gets very large. The quality of these instruments is often poor 
because they tend to be only weakly correlated with first-differenced endogenous variables 
that appear in the equation. This weak correlation leads to a large bias under GMM 
estimation. Therefore, based on recent developments in the econometrics for dynamic 
panels, we estimate our equations by employing the limited information maximum 
likelihood (see Baltagi, 2005, pp. 153, and references therein). For robustness of our results, 
we also conduct a sensitivity analysis with GMM. 
                                                 
4 In fact, this is exactly what bank managers tend to do when carrying out the so-called CAMEL (Capital 
Adequacy, Assets, Management Quality, Earnings and Liability measurement) analysis. 
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5. Empirical results 
This section reports and discusses the empirical results of the paper. First, we present the 
findings on the response of total loan growth of banks during periods when consumers, 
CEOs or banks are anxious. For comparison purposes, we also present the results on the 
response of total loan growth during recessions. Second, we examine the same effect for 
those anxious periods that actually led to a recession5 and for the anxious periods that only 
occurred after 2001Q4. Third, we explore the response of banks’ loan growth for the three 
main loan categories: loans to consumers, (ii) commercial and industrial loans, and (iii) 
loans secured by real estate. Fourth, we examine the lending behavior of only large and very 
large banks. Fourth, we conduct several other robustness exercises to ensure that the results 
are not driven by the key assumptions made on the empirical strategy and the set of 
variables employed. 
Note that the definition for anxieties for consumers and CEOs is falling confidence; 
that is, the change in confidence is always negative. In contrast, the change in the terms of 
credit is always positive. For illustrative convenience, we convert the sign of changes in 
anxieties for consumers and CEOs from negative to positive so that interpretation of the 
results is uniform across all agents and a higher value on the respective indices reflects 
higher anxiety. Thus, if for example the impact of the anxiety variable on loan growth is 
negative, then the interpretation of a negative coefficient on the interaction term between the 
anxiety variable and banks’ capitalization is banks with higher capital reducing their supply 
of loans by more than the average bank. 
For expositional brevity, and because we are interested in the interaction (partial) 
effects that characterize loan supply, the estimation results of the main terms are not 
                                                 
5 These are the quarters that just precede the beginning of the three recession periods in our sample where 
consumers, CEOs, and banks were all anxious: 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q2-2001Q4, and 2008Q1-2009Q2.  
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reported for all estimated equations. For the baseline regressions, we report and discuss the 
results of the main effects in the Appendix.6 In general, the results on the main effects are 
consistent with expectations, suggesting that higher anxiety reflects lower loan growth rates. 
This effect holds irrespective of which of the three agents is considered. As discussed in the 
previous section, this main effect is driven by both loan supply and loan demand forces, and 
this is why we focus on partial effects of anxiety with the help of bank characteristics. 
Briefly, one of the most notable results is that banks’ lending responds differently to 
the anxieties of consumers, CEOs, and banks during anxious periods. Yet, this is not the case 
during recessions. During anxious periods, the response of banks’ lending to consumers’ and 
banks’ anxieties has a common denominator: credit risk. Moreover, the results are very 
similar across the two different rules we use to define anxious periods. We contend that 
these results point to a new channel of the lending behavior of banks, which can be termed 
an ‘anxiety’ or ‘expectations’ channel. Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
provide empirical evidence on the existence of such a channel in the supply of credit from 
banks and the way it operates. 
In particular, an increase in consumers’ and banks’ anxieties yields a drop in total 
loan growth for banks with a higher level of problem loans. Other bank characteristics, such 
as capitalization and liquidity do not drive the lending decisions of banks in anxious periods. 
In addition, it seems that banks’ lending behavior is affected primarily by the anxieties of 
consumers and banks themselves, both of which are clearly procyclical. In contrast, total 
loan growth is less sensitive to CEOs’ confidence, even though the growth of certain loan 
categories passes through provisioning decisions of banks. In addition, evidence exists that 
                                                 
6 The impact of the main effect of an explanatory variable, in models with interaction effects, is sometimes 
misinterpreted as the “direct effect” of this variable on the dependent variable. Unless the respective variables 
are demeaned, this is clearly incorrect and further calculations should be carried out to identify the true direct 
effect (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 190-191, and discussion in the Appendix).  
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large banks tend to react more than smaller ones to the signs of anxiety. Several robustness 
checks provide strong support for these results.  
 
5.1. Response of loan supply to agents’ anxieties during anxious periods and recessions 
Table 4 reports the results of the equations for total loan growth. Columns I through VI 
report the results when the different economic agents are anxious, while columns VII 
through IX report the results for the recession periods. Columns I, III, and V show the 
results with anxious periods defined with our first rule; that is, two consecutive quarters 
show a decline in the confidence of consumers, CEOs, and banks’ tightening of credit 
respectively,  when the economy is not in a recession. Columns II, IV, and VI report the 
respective results with anxious periods defined with our second rule; that is, one quarter 
decline in confidence, the respective variable being below (above for banks’ terms of credit) 
its sample mean, and the economy not in a recession. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In columns I and II the coefficients of the interaction terms between the change in 
consumers’ anxiety and problem loans and provisions are negative and significant, the 
former being much larger in absolute terms than the latter (coefficients/t-statistics: -1.226/-
3.256 and -0.112/-2.685, respectively, in column I). This finding shows that an increase in 
consumers’ anxiety yields a drop in total loan supply growth, which is more pronounced for 
banks with more problem loans and more provisions. An explanation for this finding is that 
banks with bad loan portfolios are more exposed to riskier borrowers and, thus, they take 
more pronounced measures in light of the worsening economic conditions. This effect is 
likely to be exacerbated if relationship-lending is strong. Thus, these banks lower the supply 
of loans to protect their balance sheet from increasing credit risk. The rest of the 
multiplicative terms come out nonsignificant, which indicates that capitalization, liquidity, 
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and size are not driving the lending decisions of banks when consumers are anxious. 
Notably, in contrast to the findings for consumers’ anxiety, the results reported in columns 
III and IV show that banks do not significantly alter their lending given a change in CEOs’ 
anxiety. 
A somewhat different picture emerges when banks are anxious themselves. In 
column V the coefficient on the interaction term between the change in banks’ anxiety and 
problem loans is negative and significant (coefficient/t-statistic: -1.847/-2.834), while the 
relevant significant coefficients for provisions and size have a positive sign (coefficients/t-
statistics: 0.225/8.731 and 0.006/1.675, respectively). These findings suggest that an 
increase in banks’ anxiety—that is, tightening in terms of credit—points to a deterioration in 
the growth of loan supply from intermediaries with loan portfolios bearing higher credit 
risk. However, for more conservative banks with more provisions, as well as for larger ones 
in terms of asset size, the negative impact of anxiety on loan growth seems to be 
substantially smaller (if not turning positive). Rationally, banks with more problematic loan 
portfolios face significant problems and lower their lending as the credit quality of loan 
customers, old and new alike, worsens. This lowering leaves ample room for larger banks 
and banks with a higher level of provisions in the previous year to compete in the loan 
market. The results are quite similar when we employ our second rule for banks’ anxious 
periods (see column IV), the only exception being that the interaction effect on provisions is 
no longer statistically significant. 
The above findings are in line with Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Gorton and 
He’s (2008) theoretical predictions on the impact of bank competition on banks’ lending 
behavior. Larger banks are possibly better equipped to extract the greater and more 
profitable, though more difficult to obtain, private information about borrowers during 
anxious periods where uncertainty rises (Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) 
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and to place greater and more costly effort into the screening of borrowers during such 
phases (Ruckes, 2004). Furthermore, banks with a higher level of provisions in the previous 
period can be in a better position to compete for borrowers during anxious phases. However, 
as Gorton and He (2008) argue, this strategic competition among banks can lead to periodic 
credit crunches. 
The positive coefficient on the multiplicative term between banks’ anxiety and size is 
also consistent with a moral-hazard mechanism for banks. As increased banks’ anxiety 
triggers intensified competition between banks, it might be the case that larger banks 
respond by shifting to more risky projects in search for yield. This mechanism was first 
proposed by Keeley (1990) and will be further analyzed later when we examine the behavior 
of large and very large banks (recall that the bank-anxiety index was constructed on the 
basis of large banks). Here, we should note that this sort of banking behavior during anxious 
periods could be a recipe for a banking crisis when things in the economy become worse 
than expected and, thus, exacerbate the passing from an anxiety to a recession period. 
In a nutshell, and given the fact that consumers’ confidence and bank confidence are 
more or less procyclical while CEOs’ confidence is not, it seems that banks’ lending 
behavior is affected by those agents’ anxieties and expectations that more closely follow the 
business cycle. This is a rational behavior, as banks respond only when they expect that they 
will be facing problems in the near future. This reasoning is consistent with Rajan’s (1994) 
theoretical prediction about banks’ short-term interest. However, the fact that banks do not 
alter their supply of loans when their bigger customers are anxious shows that in this respect 
they neglect an indicator—CEOs’ confidence—that responds earlier and more profoundly 
than consumers’ confidence to shocks (Bachman and Sims, 2010). This neglect can have a 
serious effect on the health of bank portfolios in the medium term. Moreover, the above 
results verify the argument of many researchers (e.g., Rajan, 1994; Ruckes, 2004) that 
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banking problems originate during periods of good economic prospects, but during which 
credit risk accumulates. 
Columns VII to IX report the results for the recession periods. A notable difference 
from the results for anxious periods is that now the interaction term of bank liquidity turns 
out significant with a negative sign in all cases. This finding stresses the importance of 
injecting liquidity into the financial system during recessions. High problem loans still 
impact banks’ lending behavior negatively. However, the relevant coefficient is much 
smaller in absolute terms than during anxious periods. This result might reflect that some 
banks prepare for the more stressful economic conditions of a recession during the 
precedent anxious times. Alternatively, it might be that the worst case scenario has 
materialized and banks look forward to better upcoming economic conditions. Lastly, the 
coefficients on the interaction between anxiety and bank size are positive and significant in 
all cases. This result clearly implies that during recessions the supply of loans and thus the 
funding of the economy originates primarily from larger banks. 
 
5.2. Response of loan supply to agents’ anxieties during specific anxious periods 
To examine whether the response of the lending behavior of banks to agents’ anxieties plays 
a role in the unfolding of a recession or in the recent financial crisis, we repeat the analysis 
for the following specific anxious periods: (i) 1990Q3–1991Q1, 2001Q2–2001Q4 and 
2008Q1–2009Q2that precede the three recession periods in our sample; and (ii) those that 
occurred after the end of the 2001Q2–2001Q4 recession. The choice for the latter period is 
dictated by the much talked about credit expansion that took place during the 2000s and its 
possible effect on the financial crisis. Furthermore, the main institutional reforms in the U.S. 
financial system had already been implemented by that time, resulting in a more 
homogeneous period. Due to space considerations and because the findings are very similar, 
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we report only the results obtained from using our first rule for the identification of anxious 
periods. 
The results are reported in Table 5. It is clear that the average banks’ behavior 
appears to be different in anxiety periods that lead to a recession as compared to the average 
behavior for all anxiety periods. Specifically, regarding the anxious periods that precede a 
recession, column I shows that the negative impact of consumers’ anxiety on loan growth is 
less potent and only affects banks with more problem loans, while other bank characteristics 
don’t play any significant role. This result implies that banks with more problem loans do 
not behave according to the short-term interest theory. This behavior is either due to moral-
hazard or due to the fact that the signs of increased consumers’ anxiety and the associated 
higher risk for a recession are not properly considered by these banks. The same holds for 
more conservative banks, as the results in columns I and II of Table 4 suggest. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
When CEOs’ anxiety is employed, the results in Column II show that the impact of 
falling CEOs’ confidence on loan growth is greater for larger banks. Considering the 
equivalent bank anxiety regression (Column III), for banks with more problem loans and 
bigger size the impact of anxiety on loan growth is weaker, while the opposite holds for 
banks with more capitalization. 
This bank behavior might be explained by the expansionary monetary policy that 
usually prevails before recessions in an effort to avoid the recession or to ease its severity 
and the resultant behavior of banks to protect the growth rates of their earnings. Moreover, 
these findings could be related to the moral hazard and/or competition mechanisms outlined 
in subsection 5.1 above. Then, our findings combined with these mechanisms provide a 
good explanation for the 2007–2009 financial turmoil. Banks, and especially large and/or 
very risky ones, continued to lend more than the average bank even just before the 
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beginning of the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007. These banks’ lending policies 
accelerated the events and exacerbated the crisis, which eventually found many banks with 
low levels of liquid assets and portfolios consisting of very risky loans. However, these 
findings should be interpreted with caution, because they do not imply that  banks’ lending 
behavior plays a role whether or not a recession occurs. They just suggest that the lending 
behavior of banks during anxious phases that precede recessions is different on average than 
the effect of the anxieties of agents during anxious phases that do not lead to a recession. 
Even more remarkable are the results for the anxious periods observed after 2001Q4, 
especially when we use consumers’ anxiety. The negative effect of anxiety on loan growth 
reverses for larger banks (column IV), while the same is true for banks with more provisions 
when CEOs’ anxiety is employed (column V). Lastly, the nonsignificant partial effects in 
column VI show that banks’ anxiety had no impact on their lending behavior. Overall, it 
seems that in this period banks were behaving as if they were protected from credit risk, 
even though the developments in 2007–2008 showed that this was not true for all banks. 
 
5.3. Loan supply for different loan categories during anxious periods 
Table 6 shows the results when we use different loan categories as dependent variables. 
With this analysis we not only investigate more thoroughly the lending decisions of banks, 
but we also further relax concerns on the simultaneity problem. Specifically, as already 
mentioned in Section 4, identification is guaranteed as long as the impact of each agent’s 
anxiety is not uniform across banks with differential characteristics. This argument is further 
strengthened when different loan categories are examined. Rationally, the impact of, for 
example, consumers’ anxiety should not have any demand effect on commercial and 
industrial loans. The same holds for CEOs’ anxiety and loans to individuals and consumers. 
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Again, for space considerations we report only the results with our first rule for the 
identification of anxious periods. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Once again, an increase in the anxieties of consumers, CEOs, and banks does not 
have the same impact on the supply of loans across the different loan categories, nor do 
banks behave in a consistent manner depending on their characteristics. In particular, with 
respect to loans to individuals and households (see Panel A of Table 6), more anxiety for 
consumers has a stronger negative effect on the supply of loans by banks with more problem 
loans. This finding is consistent with the result obtained for the case of total loans. A more 
complicated picture emerges when CEOs’ anxiety increases (column II in Panel A). This 
increase in fact drives banks with higher levels of problem loans to give out more loans to 
individuals and households compared to the average bank. However, an opposite finding is 
documented for banks with a high level of provisions. Even though this result seems to be 
unreasonable, an explanation might be that CEOs’ confidence does not exhibit a procyclical 
behavior. Thus, banks with high credit risk have a higher exposure to consumers, which 
presumably are viewed as safer at the time, in an effort to improve their credit risk profile. 
In other words, risky banks shift to less risky loans. In contrast, more risk-averse banks with 
more provisions in the previous year, follow a more conservative strategy by further 
reducing their exposure to this loan category. 
In turn, when banks’ anxiety is considered (column III of Panel A), loans to 
individuals and households are higher for banks with more provisions, again providing 
evidence for increased competition for this loan category among more conservative banks. 
In contrast, the impact of banks’ anxiety on loans to individuals and households is more 
negative for larger banks.  
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Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for commercial and industrial loans. 
Interestingly, only provisions drive the lending decisions of banks for this loan category for 
all three agents’ anxieties, although the bigger impact stems from banks’ anxiety. These 
findings suggest that increasing anxiety results in banks viewing commercial and industrial 
loans as more risky than the other loan categories. Evidently, for more conservative banks 
the expected credit risk, as measured by banks’ provisions, weighs more in their lending 
decisions. 
Further, for loans secured by real estate (Panel C of Table 6), a common finding is 
that banks, except for larger ones, consider (or used to consider until the 2007–2008 crisis) 
this type of loans as safe during anxious periods. Indeed, when consumers are becoming 
more anxious, the negative impact of consumers’ and CEOs’ anxieties on loan growth is 
lower for banks with more provisions. In contrast, the negative impact of anxiety on the 
growth of loans secured by real estate is higher for larger banks. Finally, when banks are 
anxious, we do not identify any significant shifts in the supply of loans secured by real 
estate. 
The above findings are consistent with Ruckes’ (2004) prediction that banks use 
different screening processes depending on the prospects of each loan applicant’s sector; 
sectors that are predominately industrial are perceived as having more uncertain prospects 
during anxious phases. Thus, it is clear from these results that banks view commercial and 
industrial loans as more risky, while viewing loans secured by real estate as safer. 
 
5.4. Loan supply during anxious periods for large and very large banks 
The role of large and very large banks deserves special attention during anxious phases of 
the economy. Thus, we perform an analysis on total loan growth for large banks (those in the 
top 25% in terms of total assets) and very large banks (those in the top 5%). The results are 
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reported in Table 7. An interesting finding here is that very large banks react more to the 
anxieties of consumers and CEOs compared to the large ones. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In particular, the results in columns IV and V show that for very large banks with 
more problem loans the negative impact of consumers’ and CEOs’ anxieties on loan growth 
is greater. This effect is in line with the theory of the short-term interest of banks. In 
addition, this effect is larger than that observed for the full sample (see columns I and III in 
Table 4) or than the one observed for the top 25% of banks (see columns I and II of Table 7). 
Also, the fact that the interaction term between CEOs’ anxiety and problem loans is an 
important determinant of loan supply growth for very large banks shows that these banks are 
the only ones that seem to look for earlier signals of shocks when shaping their lending 
decisions. Finally, we identify a negative response of loan growth to banks’ confidence only 
for banks with high amounts of capital. 
 
5.5. Further insights and robustness checks 
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our main results and provide some 
additional insights. A first potential criticism of the analysis above is that the anxiety 
variables essentially identify the banks’ lending channel of monetary policy and not a new 
channel. Note that all estimated equations already include a bank-level lending rate and, 
thus, part of the effect of monetary policy on lending that passes through to each bank. 
However, since monetary policy is forward looking, the policy interest rate might also 
reflect expectations about the future state of the economy. 
We tackle this potential criticism by including the Federal Funds rate in equation (1), 
along with the interaction terms of this variable with the bank characteristics that potentially 
affect loan supply. We use the full time span of the panel, 19985Q1–2010Q2, since here we 
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are concerned with the identification of the channel of expectations of agents versus the 
channel of monetary policy. The results are reported in Columns I–III of Table 8. The 
multiplicative terms of variables that measure the confidence of consumers and CEOs and 
banks’ terms of credit with bank characteristics remain significant, showing that the 
‘expectations channel’ that we identify is essentially distinct from the banks’ lending 
channel.7 Further, rerunning the regressions of Table 4 (i.e., for the distinct pools of 
quarters) and including the Federal Funds rate and the relevant multiplicative terms among 
the regressors, gives very similar results. These results are available on request. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
A second criticism might be that the results are driven by the estimation method. 
Column IV of Table 8 reports the results when we re-estimate the equation presented in 
column I of Table 4 with the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM method for dynamic panels. 
As discussed above, this method is favored by the recent literature on the banks’ lending 
channel but is sometimes criticized because of the large variability of the results to only 
small changes in the set of instruments used, especially in panels with relatively large time 
frames. Here we use, as instruments, the second and third lags of our dependent and 
explanatory variables, which yield acceptable values on the Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions. The results are very similar with those obtained with the limited information 
maximum likelihood estimator. Also, similar results emerge from estimating the rest of the 
baseline specifications of Table 4 (these results are available on request). In general, this 
finding is in line with the econometric literature suggesting that for very large panels the 
results of different methods should converge (see Baltagi, 2005). 
                                                 
7 In fact, the findings show that the banks’ lending channel is not particularly potent. Even though much more 
sensitivity analysis is needed to reach such a conclusion, this finding is in line with relatively recent studies of 
the banks’ lending channel in the USA (e.g., Ashcraft, 2006). Also, the fact that a banks’ lending channel seems 
to operate primarily through bank credit risk is in line with the findings of Altunbas et al. (2010) for the 
European banking industry. 
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A third potential drawback is that, despite the fact that the change in each agent’s 
anxiety enters the estimated equations lagged, it might still be endogenous to banks’ lending 
behavior and/or to the macroeconomic environment. In column V, we conduct an additional 
sensitivity analysis to ease concerns on this issue. Specifically, we examine whether the 
results remain intact when the shock to agents’ anxieties is purely exogenous. Clearly, the 
most prominent example of such a shock is the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York. As 
expected, during the fourth quarter of 2001 all agents were anxious, while the economy was 
already in a recession. We re-run the main specifications of Table 4 (again we only report 
the one equivalent to column I of Table 4), using OLS on data for 2001Q4. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those of Table 4. 
Fourth, to provide one more argument against the potential criticism on the 
simultaneity and endogeneity issues, we examine the response of banks’ lending to agents’ 
anxieties during anxious or recession quarters, while at the same time an institutional reform 
in the financial industry was implemented.8 Clearly, such institutional reforms can be 
interpreted as exogenous positive supply shocks during these quarters, thus providing us 
with an ideal natural experiment to examine the response of banks’ lending behavior to 
anxiety. Given that the main effects presumably now reflect pure supply shocks we do not 
include interaction terms with bank characteristics. Estimations are carried out with OLS 
and the results, reported in Table 9, show that each agent’s anxiety is significant and enters 
with a negative sign, as expected. 
Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by the appraisal of current economic 
conditions but indeed by diminishing expectations about future economic outcomes, we 
                                                 
8 These quarters are: (i) for anxious consumers—1998Q4 (Citigroup was formed on October 8, 1998 following 
the $140 billion merger of Citicorp and Travelers Group, on the expectation that Glass-Steagall would be 
repealed), and 2001Q1 (the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was fully implemented, enacted on 
December 21, 2000); (ii) for anxious CEOs—1994Q4 (the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act was enacted on September 29, 1994); (iii) for anxious banks—1998Q4, 2001Q1 (see above), 
and 2000Q1 (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was fully implemented on November 12, 1999). 
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employ the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (2009) business conditions index.9 In this respect, we 
deviate from our framework on the heterogeneous agents’ expectations. We identify anxious 
quarters from this index based on the classification of the index’s values over the 1985Q1–
2010Q2 period into 8 quintiles and choose those quarters that have values of the index in the 
bottom four quintiles, that is, with values below -0.18. From this, we end up with 36 
quarters out of which 12 are recession quarters and 24 are anxiety quarters. Using these 24 
quarters we re-estimate equation (1). The results, not reported here due to space 
considerations but available on request, show that the coefficients of all the interaction terms 
between the change in the index and bank characteristics are nonsignificant. Thus, it seems 
that the current economic situation does not drive bank’s lending behavior but the 
expectations channel highlighted above does. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine empirically the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods 
of the economy. We define anxious periods from the perspective of consumers, firms 
(CEOs), and banks according to their perceptions and expectations on future economic 
conditions. Our results indicate that banks’ lending responds differently to the anxieties of 
different agents. During all anxious periods identified in the period 1985–2010 in the USA, 
the response of banks’ lending to consumers’ and banks’ anxieties has a common 
denominator—credit risk. We contend that these results point to a new channel of the 
lending behavior of banks that can be termed the ‘expectations channel.’ 
More specifically, an increase in consumers’ anxiety results in a drop in the supply of 
total loans, which is more significant for banks with more problem loans (primarily) and 
                                                 
9 The business conditions index is a real-time index, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and 
encompasses stock and flow information on several economic activity variables. This index is available on line 
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index. Here we use 
the quarterly averages for this index calculated in the middle of each quarter 
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more provisions. On the other hand, banks do not seem to alter their lending decisions 
significantly with CEOs’ anxiety, while problem loans are also the key mechanism that leads 
to a decrease in loan growth when banks are anxious themselves. Other bank characteristics, 
such as capitalization and liquidity are not driving the lending decisions of banks in anxious 
periods. Moreover, banks’ anxiety in the period after 2001, seems to trigger intensified 
competition among larger banks in the supply of credit, as we identify that the negative 
effect of anxiety on loan growth is substantially weaker (if not turning positive) as bank size 
increases. This finding is important, as it suggests a moral-hazard mechanism working 
through expectations and provides an explanation for the developments that led to the 
financial crisis of 2007. As for different loan categories, an increase in anxiety for 
consumers, CEOs, and banks does not have the same impact across these categories, nor do 
banks behave in a consistent manner depending on their characteristics. 
All in all, it seems that the lending behavior of banks is affected by consumers’ and 
banks’ anxieties, both of which are procyclical. It seems that banks respond only when they 
expect that they will be facing problems in the near future, a finding consistent with Rajan’s 
(1994) theoretical prediction for banks’ short-term interest. However, a notable finding is 
that there is considerable asymmetry between the impact of anxiety in periods that do not 
lead to recessions and the impact of anxiety in periods that actually lead to a crisis. Along 
with the evidence presented for the period after 2001, this finding provides evidence that the 
role of banks in the actual occurrence of a crisis is important. 
 
Appendix. Results on the main effects 
The findings on the main effects of the regressions presented in Section 4 are consistent with 
expectations. In Table A1 we report the results on the main effects of the regressions I, III, V 
and VII of Table 4, which are the baseline results of the paper. The main effects of the rest of 
the estimated equations are available on request.  
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[Insert Table A1 here] 
A first interesting finding is that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable turns out 
negative and statistically significant. The negative sign is intuitive, since the dependent 
variable is in differences. However, the value of the coefficient is not particularly high, 
showing that loan growth persists only to a moderate extent. 
The coefficients on the bank-level and macroeconomic variables included in 
interaction terms should be interpreted with caution. Remember that we have mean-centered 
all variables included in interaction effects. Consider for example the coefficient on ∆ in 
consumers’ anxiety = -0.067 (t-statistic = -4.58) in column I. This coefficient measures the 
effect of a change in consumers’ anxiety at time t-1 on loan growth at time t, at the mean 
value of capitalization, liquidity, problem loans, provisions and size.         
The results show that banks with higher levels of capital today will increase their 
lending activity in the following year. This is expected as very high capital levels are 
expensive to hold and banks will use excess capital of the previous period to expand, inter 
alia, their lending. The same holds for liquidity only when consumers are anxious. A high 
level of provisions and non-performing loans imply lower loan growth. This shows that both 
these credit risk measures are needed into the empirical model and that a high level of credit 
risk today will signal a very risky position, so that banks will find it optimal to decrease 
lending in the future. The impact of a change in the lending rate on loan growth is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This shows that our choice for a price variable (lending rate) 
in the reduced-form equation is sensible.  
More importantly, the main effects on the anxiety variables obtain values -0.067 (t-
statistic = -4.58), -0.087 (t-statistic = -3.84) and -0.048 (t-statistic = -3.38) for regressions I, 
II and III of Table A1, respectively. Note that by themselves these coefficients contain both 
demand- and supply-side effects. As discussed above only the multiplicative terms of these 
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variables with bank characteristics can be interpreted as supply-side effects. However, this 
finding verifies the quality of the three variables as indices capturing the anxiety of 
economic agents, and shows that the model is well-specified. Also, given the negative and 
significant effect of anxiety on loan growth, stemming from demand- and supply-side 
effects, the results are in-line with expectations. 
Concerning the rest of the macroeconomic and regulatory control variables, we find 
that a positive change in industrial production in the previous quarter, affects positively the 
contemporaneous loan growth. In turn, the impact of the regulatory dummies shows that the 
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in 1989 (regulatory dummy 1) increased loan 
growth. In the literature (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002), this is attributed to 
the increased security felt by banks due to the deposit insurance scheme or to the associated 
moral hazard mechanism, leading banks to expand lending or risk-taking. Further, the 
enactment of the “Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act” in 1994, also exerted a 
strong positive effect on lending, through the abolition of geographic requirements and 
associated exploitation of economies of scale. 
 
Table A1 
Supplement to Table 4: Main effects of regressions 
 I II III IV 
Period type:                          Anxious Recessions 
Agent type:  Consumers CEOs Banks  
Lagged dependent 
-0.084* -0.068** -0.081** -0.096** 
(-1.81) (-2.11) (-2.01) (-2.33) 
Capitalization 
0.221*** 0.241*** 0.262*** 0.215*** 
(8.07) (6.93) (4.82) (7.88) 
Liquidity 
0.096*** 0.045* 0.021 0.145*** 
(3.87) (1.88) (0.57) (5.13) 
Problem loans 
-0.422*** -0.144 -0.208*** -0.519*** 
(-7.46) (-0.64) (-3.79) (9.48) 
Provisions 
-0.006** 0.004* -0.054*** -0.019*** 
(-2.36) (1.71) (-8.52) (-3.28) 
Size 
-0.026*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.028*** 
(-15.49) (-18.33) (-18.54) (-17.92) 
∆ in lending rate 
-0.029*** -0.014** -0.027*** -0.030*** 
(-3.14) (-2.36) (-3.10) (-3.61) 
∆ in industrial 0.655*** 0.397 0.292*** 0.728*** 
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production (12.57) (7.97) (5.71) (13.55) 
Regulatory dummy 1 
0.022*** 0.008***  0.026*** 
(18.43) (5.05)  (16.47) 
Regulatory dummy 2 
0.009*** 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
(6.64) (17.73) (6.69) (6.28) 
∆ in consumers’ anxiety 
-0.067***   -0.094*** 
(-4.58)   (-8.10) 
∆ in CEOs’ anxiety 
 -0.087***   
 (-3.84)   
∆ in banks’ anxiety 
  -0.048***  
  (-3.38)  
Constant 
0.010*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.010*** 
(7.84) (6.20) (20.07) (7.45) 
Notes: The table reports the main effects of the regressions I, III, V and VII of 
Table 4. The rest of the notes remain as in Table 4. 
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 Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
 
A. Dependent variables 
∆ in total loans 
Change in the natural logarithm of total loans over the 
previous quarter 
FDIC Call 
Reports and own 
calculations 
∆ in loans to individuals 
Change in the natural logarithm of loans to individuals and 
households over the previous quarter 
∆ in commercial and industrial loans 
Change in the natural logarithm of commercial and industrial 
loans over the previous quarter 
∆ in loans secured by real estate 
Change in the natural logarithm of loans secured by real estate 
over the previous quarter 
 
B. Explanatory variables 
 
a) Bank-level variables* 
 
Capitalization The ratio of total equity capital to total assets 
FDIC Call 
Reports and own 
calculations 
Liquidity 
The ratio of liquid assets (cash and short-term securities) to 
total assets 
Problem loans The ratio of non-performing or problem loans to total loans 
Provisions The ratio of provision for loan and lease losses to total loans  
Size The natural logarithm of real total assets 
∆ in lending rate 
The change over the previous quarter of the ratio of interest 
and fee income on loans to total loans 
 
b) Variables characterizing  the state of the economy  
∆ in industrial production volume 
Change in the natural logarithm of the US industrial 
production volume over the previous quarter (data is 
seasonally adjusted) Datastream 
∆ in the Federal Funds rate Change in the Federal funds rate over the previous quarter 
 
c) Variables characterizing the anxiety of agents 
∆ in consumers’ anxiety  
Change in the natural logarithm of US consumer confidence 
over the previous quarter for:  
a) Anxious periods, i.e. periods when the value of consumer 
confidence: 
(i) declines for two consecutive quarters and the economy 
not being in a recession, or (alternatively) 
(ii) declines in one quarter, its value in that quarter is below 
its mean value across the full sample and the economy 
not being in a recession. 
b) Recessions, according to NBER dating 
Datastream 
(The Conference 
Board) 
NBER 
∆ in CEOs’ anxiety 
Change in the natural logarithm of US CEO confidence over 
the previous quarter for:  
a) Anxious periods, i.e. periods when the value of CEO 
confidence: 
(i) declines for two consecutive quarters and the economy 
not being in a recession, or (alternatively) 
(ii) declines in one quarter, its value in that quarter is below 
its mean value across the full sample and the economy 
not being in a recession. 
b) Recessions, according to NBER dating 
 Table 1 (continued) 
∆ in banks’ anxiety 
Change in banks’ terms of credit for commercial and industrial 
loans to medium and large firms for:  
a) Anxious periods, i.e. periods when the value of banks’ terms 
of credit: 
 (i) increases for two consecutive quarters and the economy 
not being in a recession, or (alternatively) 
(ii) increases in one quarter, its value in that quarter is 
above its mean value across the full sample and the 
economy not being in a recession. 
b) Recessions, according to NBER dating 
Senior Loan 
Officer Opinion 
Survey, Federal 
Reserve 
NBER 
 
d) Regulatory variables 
Regulatory dummy 1 
Dummy variable obtaining a value 1 from 1989q3 onwards to 
capture the effect of the “Financial Institutions Reform and 
Recovery Act”, enacted on August 9, 1989 Sherman, M. 
(2009) 
Regulatory dummy 2 
Dummy variable obtaining a value 1 from 1994q4 onwards to 
capture the effect of the “Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act”, enacted on September 29, 1994 
 Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Total loans 1,111,849 334,169.1 5,210,546 3 7.16e+08 
Loans to individuals 1,059,077 52,690.4 937,991.4 0 1.37e+08 
Commercial and Industrial loans 1,103,425 80,156.2 1,090,417 0 1.42e+08 
Loans secured by real estate 1,104,071 166,295.1 2,983,432 0 4.75e+08 
Capitalization 1,070,791 0.11 15.69 -1.47 0.73 
Liquidity 1,106,024 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.99 
Problem loans 1,067,112 0.007 1.01 0.00 0.86 
Provisions 1,058,097 0.005 0.44 -10.08 1.09 
Size 1,112,213 11.27 2.46 5.65 21.29 
Lending rate 1,052,338 0.06 1.23 0.01 0.23 
Industrial production volume 1,116,397 74.35 15.10 54.39 100.45 
Consumer confidence 1,116,397 97.00 23.98 29.87 142.10 
CEO confidence 1,116,397 53.04 8.60 24.00 73.00 
Bank terms of credit  805,744 9.51 23.76 -24.1 83.6 
Notes: Sample period is 1985Q1-2010Q2 (for bank terms of credit the sample period is 1990Q2-
2010Q2). The table presents the number of observations (obs.), the mean, the standard deviation (std. 
dev.), the minimum (min.) and the maximum (max.) of the unformatted (i.e. before taking logarithms) 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in Table 1 and values are in 
thousands USD. 
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Table 3  
Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Capitalization 1.00           
(2) Liquidity 0.08 1.00          
(3) Problem loans 0.02 0.04 1.00         
(4) Provisions 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00        
(5) Size  -0.18 -0.16 -0.09 0.00 1.00       
(6) Lending rate 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.66 -0.00 1.00      
(7) Industrial production 0.14 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 0.23 -0.00 1.00     
(8) Consumer confidence 0.06 -0.11 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.35 1.00    
(9) CEO confidence -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.18 -0.11 1.00   
(10) Bank terms of credit -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.17 -0.60 1.00  
(11) Federal funds rate -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.35 0.52 -0.40 0.05 1.00 
Notes: The table presents correlation coefficients for the full sample between the main explanatory variables of the study. 
The variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4  
The response of total loan supply growth to agents’ anxiety during anxious periods and recessions 
Period type: Anxious Periods Recessions 
Agent’s anxiety type: Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers CEOs Banks 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* capitalization 
-0.628 -0.615 -0.148 0.102 0.190 0.086 0.065 -0.003 0.058 
(-1.067) (-1.269) (-0.420) (0.802) (0.678) (0.270) (1.513) (-0.073) (1.429) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* liquidity 
0.007 0.091 -0.103 -0.007 0.432 0.300 -0.068** -0.058* -0.054* 
(0.050) (0.936) (-0.338) (-0.032) (1.118) (0.659) (-2.008) (-1.730) (-1.743) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* problem loans 
-1.226*** -1.832* -0.315 -0.616 -1.847*** -1.786** -0.426** -0.460*** -0.242* 
(-3.256) (-1.890) (-1.286) (-1.157) (-2.834) (-2.372) (-2.303) (-2.643) (-1.802) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* provisions 
-0.112*** -0.180*** 0.030 0.031 0.225*** 0.015 -0.126 0.336 0.598* 
(-2.685) (-2.735) (0.804) (0.948) (8.731) (1.006) (-0.257) (0.938) (1.753) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* size 
0.000 -0.006* -0.004 0.005 0.006* 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 
(0.026) (-1.706) (-0.488) (0.016) (1.675) (3.315) (10.448) (11.262) (6.791) 
Constant 
0.265*** 0.292*** 0.241*** 0.383*** 0.295*** 0.580*** 0.220*** 0.201*** 0.210*** 
(15.913) (18.341) (11.513) (16.381) (17.780) (14.723) (8.877) (8.205) (8.262) 
Observations 195,165 204,307 172,279 124,387 102,536 58,894 106,615 106,615 106,615 
Number of quarters 18 19 18 13 14 9 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.141 0.140 0.134 0.133 0.141 0.148 0.203 0.221 0.251 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in parentheses). Dependent variable is the change in the natural 
logarithm of total loans over the previous quarter. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. The sample for each equation includes pools of quarters over 
the period 1985Q1-2010Q2 according to whether each agent considered is anxious. For all agents higher values on the respective indices reflect higher anxiety. 
Columns I, III and V report the results with anxious periods defined as “two consecutive quarters decline in the value of the variable measuring the confidence of 
the respective agent, while the economy is not in a recession”. Columns II, IV and VI report the results with anxious periods defined as “one quarter decline in the 
value of the variable measuring the confidence of the respective agent, this variable being below its sample mean and the economy not being in a recession”. 
Estimation method is limited information maximum likelihood. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The response of total loan supply growth during specific anxious periods  
 Anxious periods that led to recessions Anxious periods after 2001Q4 
Agent’s anxiety type: Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers CEOs Banks 
 I II III IV V VI 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* capitalization 
0.035 0.023 -0.051** 0.376 -0.227 -3.748 
(1.422) (1.492) (-2.034) (1.301) (-0.683) (-0.890) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* liquidity 
0.005 0.012 -0.011 0.418 0.010 -1.816 
(0.298) (1.291) (-0.487) (1.419) (0.031) (-0.789) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* problem loans 
0.195** -0.065 0.125* 0.677 16.416 1.172 
(2.547) (-0.920) (1.820) (0.544) (1.125) (0.149) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* provisions 
0.000 0.000 -0.012 -2.794 7.845*** -20.916 
(0.092) (0.060) (-1.226) (-0.832) (2.972) (-1.354) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* size 
0.000 -0.000** 0.001*** 0.027*** 0.013 0.009 
(0.275) (-2.368) (3.922) (4.687) (0.861) (0.172) 
Constant 
0.265*** 0.253*** 0.250*** 0.602*** 0.566*** 1.164*** 
(31.712) (31.478) (30.783) (7.173) (7.978) (3.615) 
Observations 17,032 10,498 10,121 55,046 62,579 22,711 
Number of quarters 5 2 2 6 7 3 
R-squared 0.149 0.145 0.147 0.169 0.172 0.150 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in parentheses). 
Dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of total loans over the previous quarter. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 1. The sample for each equation includes pools of quarters over the period 1985Q1-2010Q2 according to 
whether each agent considered is anxious. For all agents higher values on the respective indices reflect higher anxiety. 
Anxious periods are defined as “two consecutive quarters decline in the value of the variable measuring the confidence of the 
respective agent and the economy is not in a recession”.  Estimation method is limited information maximum likelihood.  ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6  
The response of loan supply growth for different loan categories during anxious periods 
Dep. variable: 
Panel A: ∆ in loans to individuals  
and households 
Panel B: ∆ in commercial and  
industrial loans 
Panel C: ∆ in loans secured by 
real estate 
Agent’s anxiety type: Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers CEOs Banks 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* capitalization 
-0.392* -0.589 -0.036 0.478 0.009 -0.003 -0.042 -0.398 -0.101 
(-1.903) (-1.240) (-0.118) (1.467) (0.021) (-0.014) (-0.285) (-1.637) (-0.825) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* liquidity 
-0.225 -0.321 -0.100 0.116 -0.408 -0.329 -0.121 -0.090 -0.036 
(-1.615) (-0.824) (-0.537) (0.671) (-0.780) (-1.259) (-1.269) (-0.350) (-0.297) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* problem loans 
-1.794*** 3.950** -1.028 -1.217 -6.692 -0.987 -0.507 0.763 -0.258 
(-2.784) (2.544) (-1.328) (-1.549) (-1.123) (-0.883) (-1.142) (0.574) (-0.416) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* provisions 
0.157 -0.237*** 0.139*** -0.268*** -0.051*** -0.905** 0.020* 0.014*** 0.099 
(0.324) (-2.818) (13.080) (-7.239) (-22.563) (-2.375) (1.837) (3.973) (0.416) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* size 
-0.009** -0.004 -0.014** -0.013 0.021 -0.008 -0.008*** -0.015** 0.002 
(-2.131) (-0.466) (-2.113) (-1.515) (1.333) (-1.226) (-2.624) (-2.195) (0.53) 
Constant 
0.342*** 0.424*** 0.517*** 0.298*** 0.289*** 0.570*** 0.247*** 0.208*** 0.235*** 
(15.900) (17.752) (17.822) (13.692) (10.472) (7.500) (18.071) (11.339) (12.339) 
Observations 193,980 171,117 101,807 190,749 167,984 99,642 194,001 171,202 101,870 
Number of quarters 18 18 14 18 18 14 18 18 14 
R-squared 0.142 0.138 0.149 0.141 0.142 0.138 0.147 0.145 0.135 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variables are given on the 
first line of the table. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. The sample for each equation includes pools of quarters over the period 1985Q1-2010Q2 
according to whether each agent considered is anxious. For all agents higher values on the respective indices reflect higher anxiety. Anxious periods are defined 
as “two consecutive quarters decline in the value of the variable measuring the confidence of the respective agent and the economy is not in a recession”. 
Estimation method is limited information maximum likelihood.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
The response of total loan supply growth during anxious periods for large and very large banks 
 Top 25% banks Top 5% banks 
Agent’s anxiety type: Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers CEOs Banks 
 I II III IV V VI 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* capitalization 
-1.155 0.663 -0.027 0.541 2.362 -1.633** 
(-1.535) (0.629) (-0.075) (0.657) (1.248) (-2.009) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* liquidity 
-0.203 -0.203 0.192 0.173 -0.925 0.426 
(-0.789) (-0.318) (0.532) (0.316) (-0.592) (0.522) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* problem loans 
-2.737* -24.769 -1.193 -7.756** -89.367*** -2.448 
(-1.880) (-0.985) (-0.447) (-2.052) (-2.906) (-0.470) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* provisions 
0.312 3.612*** 0.094 0.214 3.566 1.494 
(0.957) (4.845) (0.671) (0.073) (0.281) (0.552) 
∆ in agents’ anxiety* size 
0.010 0.003 -0.006 -0.014 0.025 -0.006 
(1.423) (0.247) (-0.720) (-0.531) (0.340) (-0.258) 
Constant 
0.631*** 0.464*** 0.505*** 1.053*** 1.046*** 1.083*** 
(8.240) (8.581) (11.191) (5.358) (5.542) (4.734) 
Observations 44,931 44,644 27,685 7,938 7,753 4,830 
Number of quarters 18 18 14 18 18 14 
R-squared 0.192 0.202 0.188 0.195 0.209 0.193 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in parentheses). 
Dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of total loans over the previous quarter. The explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 1. The sample for each equation includes pools of quarters over the period 1985Q1-2010Q2 
according to whether each agent considered is anxious. For all agents higher values on the respective indices reflect 
higher anxiety. Anxious periods are defined as “two consecutive quarters decline in the value of the variable measuring 
the confidence of the respective agent and the economy is not in a recession”. Estimation method is limited information 
maximum likelihood.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
49
Table 8 
Sensitivity analysis I 
 Whole sample period GMM estimates Only 2001Q4 
Confidence type: Consumers CEOs Banks Consumers Consumers 
 I II III IV V 
∆ in agents’ confidence* 
capitalization 
-0.048 -0.095** 0.038 -0.622 -0.560 
(-0.646) (-2.007) (1.306) (-1.497) (-0.808) 
∆ in agents’ confidence* 
liquidity 
0.009 0.020 -0.014 0.006 0.037 
(0.203) (0.374) (-0.670) (0.056) (0.277) 
∆ in agents’ confidence* 
problem loans 
-1.489 -0.329** -0.128* -1.223*** -1.336*** 
(-1.402) (-1.967) (-1.897) (-3.120) (-3.394) 
∆ in agents’ confidence* 
provisions 
0.168* 0.026** -0.006 -0.111** -0.189*** 
(1.781) (2.391) (-0.132) (-2.465) (-2..788) 
∆ in agents’ confidence* 
size 
0.013*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.002 
(11.315) (11.649) (7.475) (0.027) (0.458) 
Federal funds rate* 
capitalization 
-0.023 -0.017 -0.011   
(1.326) (-1.040) (-0.410)   
Federal funds rate * 
liquidity 
-0.001 -0.007 -0.007   
(-0.131) (-0.704) (-0.214)   
Federal funds rate* 
problem loans 
-0.185** -0.180** -0.018   
(-2.068) (-2.248) (-0.148)   
Federal funds rate* 
provisions 
-0.010 -0.011 -0.063   
(-0.255) (-0.266) (-0.354)   
Federal funds rate* size 
-0.001** -0.000 -0.000   
(-2.376) (-1.125) (-0.940)   
Constant 
0.264*** 0.261*** 0.332*** 0.284*** 0.290*** 
(31.848) (31.629) (19.925) (19.333) (14.646) 
Observations 974,194 974,194 703,727 195,165 8,670 
Number of Quarters 102 102 81 18 1 
R-squared 0.188 0.184 0.176 0.142 0.284 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in 
parentheses). Dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of total loans over the previous quarter. 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. In Columns I-III the federal funds rate and its interaction 
terms with bank characteristics also enter equation (1) and the regressions are run on the full sample period 
(1985Q1-2010Q2).  For Column IV the sample includes pools of quarters over the period 1985Q1-2010Q2 in 
which consumers are anxious. For Column V only 2001Q4 is used.  For all agents higher values on the 
respective indices reflect higher anxiety. Anxious periods are defined as “two consecutive quarters decline in 
the value of the variable measuring the confidence of the respective agent and the economy is not in a 
recession” For Columns I-III estimation method is limited information maximum likelihood, for column IV 
the GMM of Blundell and Bond and for Column V OLS.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Sensitivity analysis II 
 Whole sample period 
Confidence type: Consumers CEOs Banks 
 I II III 
∆ in consumers’ anxiety 
-0.006***   
(-6.594)   
∆ in CEOs’ anxiety  -0.001*  
  (-1.657)  
∆ in banks’ anxiety   -0.008*** 
   (-9.203) 
Constant 
0.253*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 
(-31.169) (-31.428) (-31.258) 
Observations 974,194 974,194 974,194 
R-squared 0.144 0.168 0.188 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of the main effects of the anxiety 
variables from equation (1) and their t-statistics (in parentheses).  
Interaction effects are not employed in these regressions. Dependent 
variable is the change in the natural logarithm of total loans over the 
previous quarter. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
The sample for each equation includes quarters where a regulatory 
change occurred in the US banking industry. For all agents higher 
values on the respective indices reflect higher anxiety. Anxious 
periods defined as “two consecutive quarters decline in the value of 
the variable measuring the confidence of the respective agent, while 
the economy is not in a recession”. Estimation method is OLS. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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